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ABSTRACT

Faking good on personality measures has traditionally been
cdnceptualized as a threat to validity. However, many have called for
treating faking good as an individual difference variable that may be

predictive in its own right. Faking good is conceptuaily relate^ to
Self-Monitoring, Social Desirability, arid Impressiori Management. In the

present study, it was hypothesized that the tendericy to fake good on the

Big Five personality dimensions would ioe correlated with higher
on Self-Monitoring, Social Desirability, and Impression Management. The
method involved a repeated measures design. Time one was the ho^^^

condition where subjects completed a measure of the Big Five personality

dimensions with instructions to respond ho^n^^^^

timri two was the

condition where subject completed the same persbhality measure with
instructions to respond: as a job applicant attempting to give as good

impression as possible in order to obtain the job. Results indicate that

faking good, as measured by within-subject correlations between the

honest and fake conditions, was not sigriificantly correiated w^
constructs of Self-Monitoring, Social Desirability, nor Impression

;

Management. , Problems associated with the current measures of faking, as
well as implications for future research on the individual difference
variable of faking good are discussed.
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Introduction

Human resource selection includes, many potential methods of

assessment.

Personality assessment is one such method, and is a dynamic

field of research.

In past decades, the use of personality measures as

selection instruments has been held in poor regard because of their

questionable predictiveness of job related criteria {Guion & Cottier,
1966). This may have been due to the types of personality measures that

were used to predict job performance.

These measures were typically

assessments of psychopathology (e.g., MMPI) rather than specific

categories of personality traits that could be linked to specific work
behaviors.

However, researchers have switched from using

psychopatholigcal measures of personality to measures of normal range

personality traits (e.g., NEO PI); and more recently, the validity of
personality measures for predicting a variety of job related outcomes
has received empirical support (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Tett, Jackson, &
Rothstein, 1991).

Recent research indicates that the validity of

personality measures is acceptable when the personality constructs
assessed are part of a widely accepted, unified framework of traits.
Barrick and Mount (1991) conducted a meta-analysis in order to

assess the validity of the Big Five personality dimensions
(Extraversion, Emotional Stability, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness,

and Intellect) as predictors of job performance.

The criteria of job

performance included job proficiency, training proficiency, and

personnel data (e.g., salary level and turnover). The results of their
meta-analysis based on 117 studies and a total sample of 23,994 revealed
that conscientiousness was a valid predictor for all criteria across,all

job categories \p ranges from .20 to .23). In addition, they found that

extraversion was a valid predictor for all performance criteria for two
job types (managers and sales).

Tett, Jackson, and Rothstein (1991) found results similar to those
of Barrick and Mount (1991).

However, their findings suggested that

Barrick and Mount's (1991) validities were underestimated.

Tett, et al.

conducted a meta-analysis on 97 studies with 13,521 subjects to

determine the predictive validity of the Big Five personality
dimensions. Type A personality, and Locus of Control for job

performance. The overall validity coefficient for these personality
measures combined for job performance was .22. This validity coefficient

was,larger than Barrick and Mount's (1991), who looked at the validity
for each of the Big Five dimensions separately. Tett, et al. note that
Barrick and Mount's overall corrected sample-weighted mean correlation
was .11, while theirs was .24.

The results of these two meta-analytic studies provide support for

Hogan's (1992) conclusion on the use of personality measurement:

^^Despite the pessimistic conclusions of reviews published in the 1960's,
evidence gathered over the past three decades suggests that personality
inventories can make valid contributions to personnel selection and

assessment" (p.910), In fact, personality tests can be valuable for

selection purposes because of their incremental validity over cognitive
ability tests. Personality tests account for unique variance that is not

accounted for by cognitive ability measures.

Another positive aspect of

personality tests is that they tend not to have adverse impact.

That

is, they do not impact protected groups under Title VII more harshly

than majority groups.

Thus, not only do personality tests add something

unique to measures of cognitive ability, they also reduce adverse impact
when used in combination with measures of cognitive ability (which do
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tend to show adverse impact).

However, one issue that has been viewed

as potentially compromising thi^ established validity of personality
characteristics in predicting a variety of job relevant criteria is
dissimulation.

Faking in Personality Inventories

There is little doubt that faking in personality measures is
possible.

Research has shown that subjects are capable of distorting

their scores on personality inventories when instructed to give as good
an impression as possible.

Dicken (1960) investigated the

susceptibility of the California Psychological Inventory (CPI) to
response distortion.

The CPI was administered to 100 introductory

psychology students.

One group.of students was, instructed to respond to

the inventory in a manner that would give the most favorable impression
of themselves.

Scores on the CPI for students in the ^^good impression"

condition were significantly higher than scores for subjects in the
standard test taking condition.

Hinrichsen, Giryll, Bradley, and Katahn (1975) examined the extent
to which the Fundamental Interpersonal Relations Orientation-Behavior

test (FIRO-B) is susceptible to faking.
undergraduate students.

This test was given to 60

There were three groups of subjects, each with

different instructions for taking the FIRO-B.

The three instructional

conditions were normal (respond honestly), fake good (role play a job
applicant seeking to appear psychplogically well-adjusted), and fake bad

(give the impression of a maladjusted person).

Results revealed that

scores on the FIRO-B were higher for subjects in the fake good condition
as compared to subjects in the normal and fake bad conditions.

indicates that faking is quite possible for the FIRO-B.

This

Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp, and McCloy (1990) also found that

subjects are capable of distorting their responses to personality
measures in the desired.direction.

These authors administered a

temperament inventory called ABLE (Assessment of Background and Life
Experiences) to over 9,000 military personnel.

In one study, subjects

were instructed to either fake good (describe yourself in a way that you

think will ensure that the Army selects you), fake bad (describe
yourself in a way that you think will ensure that the Army does not
select you), or respond honestly (describe yourself as you really are).
Results indicated that when instructed to do so, soldiers did

significantly distort their responses.

In a separate sample of

applicants at the Military Entrance Processing Station, the authors
identified those subjects who positively distorted their responses to
ABLE through a Social Desirability scale.

The authors concluded that

the applicant sample did not significantly distort their responses since
the mean score was not significantly different from the mean score of

incumbents.

Further, they concluded that response distortion did not

attenuate correlations between ABLE and measures of job performance.

The preceding studies are representative of the research that has

shown subjects are capable of positively distorting their scores on

personality inventories when instructed to give as good an impression as
possible.

Because there is much evidence to show that faking in

personality assessment can occur, a primary concern is that the

information obtained from personality measures is invalid if faked.

In

personnel selection, distorted personality measures are viewed as false
indicators of the traits that are supposed to predict job performance.
As Hough, et al. (1990) note, '''Indeed, the possibility of response
distortion is often cited as one of the main arguments against the use

of personality measures to aid in selection decisions'' (p. 581). One

way in which this concern is addressed is by the detection of faked
responses through social desirability scales.
Social Desirability and Impression Management

Socially desirable responding is probably the most extensively
studied response bias, and refers to the tendency to respond in such a
manner so as to make one's self look good (Paulhus, 1991). Researchers

have shown that responding in order to give a good impression (or faking
good) is related to the social desirability of the test items. Dunnett,
Koun, and Barber (1981) examined the degree to which the social
desirability of test items can distort the Eysenck Personality Inventory
(EPI). These authors administered the EPI to British subjects

(professionals as well as students) and instructed them to either

present themselves in the best possible light/ the worst possible light,
or as honest as possible.

A separate group of subjects was asked to

rate each item on.the EPI in terms of its social desirability (how

acceptable and likable a person making such a statement would be viewed
by society). Results indicated that subjects in the fake good condition
scored significantly higher on the Extraversion scale of the EPI, and

significantly lower on the Neuroticism scale than subjects in the honest
condition.

Moreover, '"fake good" subjects tended to endorse items that

correlated highly with the items the separate group of subjects rated as
socially desirable. Therefore, this study provides evidence that the
concepts of faking good to give a positive impression of oneself and
socially desirable responding are related.
In studies that have examined the susceptibility of personality

measures to faking, instructions to fake good include, ^'present yourself

in the best possible light" (Dunnett, et al., 1981, p.20); ""give the

most favorable possible impression of yourself^ (Dickeri/ 1960, p.,25);

^Mescribe yourself in a way that will ensure that the Army selects you"
(Hough, et al., 1990, p. 586). All of these descriptions instruct the
subjects to engage in what is known as impression management.

Impression management refers to the way in which people present a

positive impression of themselves to others. Giacalone and Rosenfeld
(1989) suggest that people are actors who take on many different roles.
We attempt to please our audiences using various impression management
tactics in order to avoid looking bad.

Thus, we manage the impressions

we give to others to convey ourselves in the best way possible.
The instructions to ^^fake good" in the susceptibility to faking
studies cited above can be conceived of as impression management. In

personality inventories, people.who attempt to present themselves in the
best possible light (fake good) may in fact be engaging in impression
management tactics.

The issue of faking and impression management has been addressed

directly by Paulhus (1984), who has shown that social desirability
consists of two components - one of which is impression management.

Paulhus (1984) proposes that there are two types of socially desirable

response biases.

He attempted to partition social.desirability

according to a two-factor model that consists of self deception and

impression management. Self deception is where the respondent honestly
believes his or her positive response distortion, and therefore it is
not a conscious attempt to dissemble.

Impression management, on the

other hand, is where the respondent consciously distorts items in a

positive direction. Paulhus tested this two-factor theory through an
exploratory factor analysis of over 150 items from a battery of six
social desirability scales.

Results revealed the two major factors that

Paulhus defined as self deception and impression management.

These

results suggest that not only are impression management and social

desirability related, but impression management is actually one
component of a socially desirable response bias.
However, recent research by Shultz and Chavez (1994) suggests

that this two factor structure of social desirability may not hold true
for non Euro-American cultures.

In their study, Shultz and Chavez

compared a social desirability scale completed in English to the same
scale completed in Spanish.

Results indicated that while the two

factors, of social desirability (self deception and impression
management) held true for the English-version sample, the pattern did
not hold for the Spanish-version sample.

Hence, researchers need .to

show caution in interpreting their results when translating scales into
a non-English language.
Impression Management and Self Monitoring

Just as impression management has been found to be a component of
social desirability, it has also been suggested to relate to self-^
monitoring.

Snyder and Copeland (1989) propose that,

A greater

understanding of the strategic dynamics involved in impression

management in organizational contexts may be gained by a consideration

of individuals' self-monitoring orientations" (p. 7).

Snyder (1974)

describes self-monitoring as a construct which refers to the control of
self-presentational behaviors.

People high in self-monitoring attend to

situational cues that guide their self-presentation of what they believe
to be appropriate behaviors.

In contrast, low self-monitors only

display behaviors consistent with their true feelings, regardless of
situational cues.

It is reasonable to make the link between impression management

and self-monitoring because they are both processes of self

presentation.

Arkin and Shepperd (1989) describe the prototypical

impression manager as the individual who is high in self-monitoring.

In

order to know how and when to present the most favorable impression of
oneself, one needs to have the skill to choose the self-presentation and

social behavior appropriate to a variety of social situations (i.e., one
needs to be a high self-monitor).

Caldwell and O'Reilly (1982) conducted a laboratory experiment to

investigate whether high self-monitoring undergraduate business subjects
would be more likely to engage in impression management tactics than low
self-monitoring subjects.

The procedure involved the subjects assuming

the role of an administrative manager.

Subjects had to prepare a report

that explained their hiring decision (as manager) of an employee who
subsequently was discharged because of ineptitude.

Subjects were

presented with a list of 34 items from which they were to select in
order to prepare the report.

Items were independently judged and

categorized as reflecting either favorable or unfavorable infoimiation
concerning the manager's decision.

The degree of subjects' self-

monitoring orientation was assessed by Snyder's (1974) self-monitoring
scale.

Results indicated that subjects who were high self-monitors were

more likely to use items in the report that reflected favorably on their
decision processes and outcomes.

Thus, high self-monitors tended to

endorse items that cast their decisions in a positive light - a tactic
that can be perceived of as impression management.

The results of Caldwell and O'Reilly's study, in combination with

Paulhus' work, suggest that it is reasonable to relate self-monitoring

and social desirability to the tendency to fake good on personality

measures/

Furthermore, Hogan (1992); states that impression management

is a tendency or trait that can be assessed by Snyder's ;(1974) SelfMonitoring Scale; and Paulhus (1984) has developed a Balanced Inventory

of Desirable Responding (BIDR) that contains an Impression Management
subscale.

Indeed, Merydith and Wailbrown (1991) assert that,

^dissimulation of presenting oneself in a favorable light is part of
social desirability^' (p. 898).

Hence, faking-good is conceptually

linked to impression management and social desirability (Paulhus, 1984;
Merydith & Wallbrown, 1991) as well as self-monitoring (Snyder, &
Copelahd, 1989). =
While it is evident that these factors of social desirability,

impression management, /and self-monitoring are related to the tendency

to/fake good, this relationship as a whole has not.been empirically
tested.

Moreover, the notion of faking good and its possible components

has not been conceptualized within a larger framework of response bias.
Faking Good and Response Bias

Paulhus (1991) defines response bias as ^''a systematic tendency to
respond to a range of questionnaire items on some bias other than the
specific content (i,e., what the items were designed to measure)" (p.

17). Response bias is a broad term which includes an entire range of
biases.

Furnham (1986) lists some of these biases:

socially desirable,

faking good, faking bad, acquiescence, nay saying, and extremity.

Depending on the consistency of the manner in which individuals respond,
a response bias could be a response set (a temporary response bias or a
reaction to situational demands), or a response style (a response bias

that is consistently displayed across time and in various situations).
That is, response styles represent consistent individual differences
(Paulhus 1991) while response sets are un-enduring reactions.

Dissimulation refers to a specific kind of response bias where the

respondent intentionally attempts to respond in a manner that will

convey a certain impression (Furnham, 1986; Merydith & Wallbrown, 1991).

Depending on one's motivation then, any type of response bias could be
viewed as dissimulation.

Furthermore, depending on one's motivation and

intentions, dissimulation may be viewed as negative or natural-

Elliott

(1981) reviews different interpretations of conscious dissimulation.

While some view it as lying, Cattel, Eber, and Tatsuoka (as cited in
Elliott, 1981) view it as produced 'half-unconscibusly'. in selection
contexts.

Heilbrun (1964) asserts that responding in order to give a

good impression or appear socially desirable is not necessarily
deliberate dissimulation or lying.

Responding in a socially desirable

manner is the way normal, healthy people respond.

Elliott (1981) argues that putting one's best foot forward in a
selection context is related to adaptiveness,

If people lack the

ability to adapt or if they misperceive the appropriate norms and adapt
to something else, they are likely to be rejected" (p. 14). Seisdedos
(1993) is also a proponent of the predictive utility of the tendency to

fake good. He views faking good as an intelligent form of adaptation,
where individuals utilize all their capabilities to adapt to the

surrounding demands.

He suggests that intentionally giving a good

impression is not a foimi of lying or deliberate faking: ^^It is not
hecessarily negative from the subject's viewpoint to show the best

^ego,' because, in some settings, that could be the way to adapt to the
circumstances" (p. 91). Thumin and Barclay,(1993) even propose that
those individuals with the tendency to fake good may be brighter, more

perceptive, and more insightful, and as such

are the same individuals

who would perform particularly well on the job" (p. 15). Thus it would

10

appear that for some people/ and in some GirpijmistanceS/ faking, good is a

natural response style rather than a conscious mis-presentationv

Faking good is a type of response bias or form of dissimulation.
While some view^i^ as false presentation^ many view it as an adaptive
ability

that leads to positive outcomes (Thumin &

BaiGlay, 1993i

The tendency to fake good is also theoretically related

to self-^
discussed above.

social desirability/ and impressiph managemerit/ as
However/ there is no model of response bias which

inGprporates: faking good and its possible comppnents^ In the present

study, I attempt to develop and test such aimpdel isee figure).
To the extent that there are reliable associations between faking

gpod> self--inoriitQring/ social •desirability, and impression management,
it is;worthwhile tP investigate how these factors may account for

variance in individual differences in f,akihg good/ ; ■
Faking Good as an Individual Difference Variable
Rather Than a Contaminant

■

.

Faking good on selection instruments has been viewed as a
contaminant to the accuracy of self reports.

People who score high on

socia1 desirabi1ity scales are assumed to be faking good {i.e., engaging
in impression management).

Consequently, the reports of these

individuals are considered invalid, and are often rejected because they

are viewed as not tapping the construct of interest (Zerbe & Paulhus,
1987).

However, it is important to distinguish between spurious effects

on personality scores and patterns of what may be personality structure.
To the extent that the effects of positive response biases are spurious,
validity is indeed threatened; but to the extent that there are
consistent effects based on the tendency to fake good/ then these

effects are potential individual difference variables that may be
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predictive in thei2: oWn right.

In reviewing Cronbach's as^ertip^^^

on

response sets, Jackson and Messick (1958) suggest that the tendency to

fake good may ^''not always be teir^orary and trivial, but may have a
stable and valid component which reflects a Gonsistent individual style
or personality trait" (p. 244).

Additionally, they suggest that for

certain circumstances, personal response styles (which are consistent

across time and situations) should be enhanced as opposed to being
.".'avoided :or:-corrected:.,

Instead of conceptualizing faking good as a contaminant or

something negative, the tendency to fake good can be conceiyed of as an
individual difference variable.

Indeed, Furnham (1986) supports this

propositioh: /^Rather than considering social desirability a mere,

response artifact that threatens the validity of self-reports it should
be seen as a substantive trait useful in predicting beaviour" (p. 398)^

In his review of issues of faking in personality inventories, Hogan
- (1992) states:

... it seems reasonable to conclude that the ability to
enhance scores on a personality inventory is itself a
personality variable ... In this light, dissimulation, when
it exists, becomes less serious as a problem to overcome and

instead becomes an important individual differences variable
(p. 904).
Rynes (1993) likewise calls for further research on the ^""factors

that underlie individual differences in ^fake good' abilities" (p. 265).
Moreover, McCrae and Costa (1989) argue that faking good should be

considered a substantive trait that may be predictive of important

outcomes.

Canter (1963) suggests that there is practical importance in

the ability of subjects to present a good picture of themselves,
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. .

falsification of test scores and the capacity to do; so/inay be a

personality variable of considerable importance in its own right rather
than merely an undesirable and incidental factor to be ^corfected for"'

Canter (1963) conducted a study comparing the CPI responses of a

group of well-adjusted applicants to a group of presumably poorly
adjusted, involuntarily admitted alcoholic patients•

Both groups wefe

encouraged to fake good in their responses by the instructions, ^^imagine
you are applying for a job you really want and your employer will judge
from this test whether to hire you or not.

Answer the test in such a

^

way as to give the best possible impression of yourself" (p. 254).
Better adjusted subjects were able to increase their CPI scores more

than poorly adjusted subjects.

This suggests that some people can

enhance their scores on personality tests more than others, and they are

distinguishable by good adjustment.

This further supports -the nption:

that people differ in their tendency to fake good.
Summary

Taken together, these studies clearly support conceptualizing
faking good as an individual difference variable.

Moreover, many

researchers have proposed the predictive utility of the tendency to fake

good.

There has been much research to support that faking good can

happen; and there has been debate on whether or not, and to what extent
it threatens validity.

However, what has not been examined is how

people differ in their tendency to fake good, and what factors can

distinguish between those who possess this tendency and use it, from
those who do not.

Faking good is usually examined in terms of group

differences, and it appears that no study has attempted to treat the

tendency to fake good as a within-subject individual difference

13

variable-

Previous research has shown that faking .can happen (as

detected through group comparisons of honest and fake conditions);
however, there.is still no indicatioh of,why people can fake good.

The

mbdel tested in the present study will help illuminate the underlying
reasons for why people can display this faking:good tendency.
There is valuable infoinnation that can be gained from identifying

the iactbrs that account for Variance in: the tendency;to fake good.
Research indeed Sugg

ttiat this tendency may be predictive of

organizatipnal outcomes such as job performance (Kriedt & bawson, 1961;

Kacmary Delery, & Ferris, 1992; Ruch & Ruch, 1967; Wayne & Ferris,
1990)

outcomes can be predicted.from this tendency, it

needs to be studied (1) within its framework of response bias; and, (2)

as it relates to and can be accounted for by other factors.
Implications

The present study will add important information to the research

on personality assessment and response bias because it appears that no
study has examined faking good as an individual difference variable,
even though many have called for this treatment (Canter, 1963; Furnham,
1986; Hogan, 1992; IJackson .& Messick, 1958; Rynes, 1993).

Moreover, the

present study puts a unique perspective on the tendency to fake good in

that faking good is perceived hs a positive, adaptive, and potentially
predictive variable, as opposed to its usual treatment as a threat to
.validity (Hough, et al., 1990).

Rather than examining how faking good

may or may not contaminate validity, we should investigate the
constructs to which it is related.

Moreover, this study is one of few that have attempted to assess

individual differences in faking good, through a:within-subje.ct

procedure

Previous .research has detected the presence of faking good
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through group differences.

People are only identified as faking good

when they are compared to the mean of the group in the honest condition.
This between-subject method fails to detect any differences among
individuals in the tendency to fake good. The present study not only

attempts to detect individual differences in faking good, but also

examines the potential factors that may explain variance in this
tendency.

It is anticipated that the results of this study will support the
hypothesis that SD, SM, and IM are all significantly related to the

tendency to fake good, and account for variance in this individual
difference variable. To the extent that this holds true, further study

of faking good as a predictor of important organizational outcomes is
warranted.

Faking good may be related to job performance in certain

positions and circumstances (Kriedt & Dawson, 1961; Kacmar, Delery, &
Ferris, 1992; Ruch & Ruch, 1967; Wayne & Ferris, 1990). If these

relations between faking good, SM, SD, and IM are found to be robust,

and if the tendency to fake good is reliably predictive of job
performance in certain circumstances, faking good should not be

something in need of correction, but conceivably something for which can
be tested.

Hypotheses

1)

it is hypothesized that there will be significant correlations

between the tendency to fake good on a personality inventory and the

concepts of self-monitoring (SM), social desirability (SD), and

impression management (IM).

This model will be tested using structural

equation analysis, where the latent variables of SM, SD, and IM are

predicted to have positive paths to the latent variable of faking good
(see figure 1).

This model will be statistically tested for ^goodness
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of fit' to the sample data, which will be comprised of the observed,

variables of faking good, SM, SD, and IM.

These observed variables will

be measured using their respective scales, while faking good will be
assessed by a within-subject technique discussed below.

2)

To the extent that the factors of SM, SD, and IM are empirically

related to faking good, it is further hypothesized that those people who

:have the tendency to fake good on the personality inventory will be
distinguished by higher scores on SM, SD, and IM, while those who do not
exhibit the tendency to fake good will have lower scores on these
scales. Thus, SM, SD,- and IM will be multiple predictors of the tendency

to fake good, and will account for the variance in this tendency.
, .'V.

•

Method

f Subjects

323 subjects were recruited from undergraduate and graduate

Psychology courses at GSUSB. Gohenis power table (Gohen, 1992) suggests

that for three predictors and for medium power at a = .05, 76 subjects
per predictor should be used.

Thus for the three predictors of SM, SD,

and IM, 228 subjects were required for adequate power.

. 225 of the participants were female, 92 were male, and 6 did not

specify. 43% of the participants were Caucasian, 24.5% were Hispanic,
13.9% were African American, 5.9% were Asian, 4.3% were Filipino, 1.2%
were Native American, 0.9% were Asian Pacific Islander, and 3.4%
indicated other. 29.4% of the sample were freshman, 23.5% were

sophomore, 12.7% were junior, 25.1% were senior, and 7.7% were graduate
students.
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Materials

The personality ineasur
to fake was assessed-

the iiistruitient on which the tendency

For the purposes of this study, it was important

to utilize a personaility measure that is (1) fakabler and (2) relevaiit
to the selection context described in the instructions to participants

(see the Procedure section), A persohality diinensioh|that: fits these
criteria is ConsGientiousness, part of the Big Five Personality
Dimensions.

Conscientiousness describes one who is careful, thorough,

organized, planfui, harci~wdrkiiig> achievbrnerit,oriented, end persevering
(Barrick & Mount, 1991; Carver & Scheier, 1992 )-

The concept of

consciehtiousness is termed differently by differentjauthors.

A

compiletion of these synonymous labels is taken from Barrick and Mount
(1991) and Carver and Scheier (1992), and includes conformity,

dependability, will to achieve, responsibility, and ponscience. Peabody
and Goldberg (1989) suggest that conscientiousness relates to the life
domain of work, which would explain the ubiquitbusness of this

personality domain in job related contexts (Barrick & Mount, 1991),
Since this dimension of personality was used to measure the tendency to

fake, it was necessary to ensure that subjects who, were high in

GonscientiousheSs in both the honest and fake conditions (i.e., those

who displayed no sighificant increase in scores between the honest and
fake conditions to be described below) would not be confounded with

subjects who do not have the tendency to fake. That:is, subjects who
are at the ceiling for a personality construct have no room to enhance

their scores, and thus would not display an increase in scores from time
one to time two. These subjects would consequently be identified as not

faking good due to their high scores on the personality dimension.
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In an effort to alleviate this potential ceiling confound,

subjects were assessed on all diinensions of the Big Five (Extraversion,
Emotional Stability, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Intellect)

using Saucier's (1994) Mini-Marker's for the Big Five (see appendix a),
This measure is a subset of Goldberg's 100 unipolar Big,Five markers,

and has comparable reliability to it (Saucier, 1994). Saucier (1994)

reported reliability coefficients for each dimension:

Extraversion (a

= .83); Agreeableness (a = .81); Conscientiousness (a = ,83); Emotional
Stability (a = .78); and Intellect (a = .81). The present study used
Saucier's mini-markers in two conditions -

honest and fake (see

procedure). The reliability coefficients on each dimension for the
honest condition include:

Extraversion (a = .82); Agreeableness (a =

.76); Conscientiousness (a = .88); Emotional Stability (a = .72); and
Intellect (a = .77). The reliability coefficients for the fake good
condition were a = .76 for Extraversion, a = .79 for Agreeableness,

a ■- .92 for Conscientiousness, a = .76 for Emotional Stability, and a =
.73

for Intellect.

The tendency to fake good was assessed by a measure of the

consistency of a given subject's responses to Saucier's Big Five MiniMarkers (1994) under two conditions:

honest and fake.

This method

involved correlating subjects' scores from the honest and fake

conditions.

Lautenschlager (1986) argues that this within-subject

correlation (r„HF) is more sensitive to individual differences in faking
than other methods; thus, it is certainly appropriate in the present
study.

As Lautenschlager (1986) notes:

Large positive values will tend to indicate very
consistent subjects, generally those subject who
change their responses very little under.the different
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response [conditions] (It is possible that some of
these individuals are consistent fakers under both

response [conditions], but then no method outside of
external validation will detect them). Strong
negative correlations will tend to indicate subjects
who go to different extremes under the two response
sets, i.e., exhibit the most faking. Thus, the range
of, valuer of the correlation indicate to some extent

the degree of accuracy with which a given individual
responds to the items under the F condition relative
to the H condition (p. 311).

Gordon and: Gross (1978) propose two other methods for detecting
faking:

mean differences in scores that were obtained under the H and F

conditions (MeanF - Meann); and the variance of these same difference

scores . (S^d). Lautenschlager notes that the first method is insensitive
to individual differences in faking, but the second isn't.
second is insensitive to constant discrepancies.

However, the

Thus Lautenschlager's

method using within-subject correlations (Twrf) will be employed to
assess the tendency to fake good.
Self-Monitoring was assessed by Lennox and Wolfe's(1984) revised
Self Monitoring scale.

As Lennox and Wolfe note, Snyder's (1974) SM

scale confounds acting ability with the ability to modify one's self
presentation in daily social interactions.

Therefore, Lennox and Wolfe

(1984) developed a Revised Self-Monitoring Scale that defines the selfmonitoring construct in a more parsimonious and empirically logical
manner.

Whereas Snyder's original scale has five components, the

present only has two.

Snyder's multidimensional scale ''^extends beyond

the limits of the construct, creating a situation in which its factors
compete with one another" (Lennox and Wolfe, 1984, p. 1350).

The

Revised Self-Monitoring Scale contains 13 items and two subscales:
ability to modify self presentation (coefficient alpha = .77), and
sensitivity to expressive behavior of others (coefficient alpha = .70).

The scale as a whole has a coefficient alpha of .75 (see appendix b).
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The inclusion of the sensitive to expressive behavior of others,is

justified given Snyder/s definition of the high self-monitor as one who
possesses the ability to attend to the behavior of others, and use it as
a cue to guide self presentation (Lennox &. Wolfe, 1984).

This method of

assessing self^monitoring is congruent with its conception in the
present study, and thereby was the most appropriate way to measure it.

The present sample obtained a coefficient alpha = .726 ;for ability to

modify self presentation,, and a coefficient alpha = .668 for sensitivity
to expressive behavior of others. The scale as a whole had coefficient
alpha = .757.

^

Social Desirability was measured by using the total score for.
Paulhus/ Balanced^Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) which
measures two constructs:
Enharicement (se

Impression Management and Self-Deceptive

appendix c). When all items are summed fof a measure of

social desirable responding, the coefficient alpha is .83 (Paulhus,
1991)1 The

coefficient alpha in the current sample for Social

Desirability is .820.

Impression Management will be assessed by Paulhus' Impression ;
Management subscale of the BIDR. Coefficient alphas range from .75 to
.86 for this subscale (Paulhus, 1991). The current sample obtained a

coefficient alpha = .816 for Impression Management. For the subscale of

Self-Deceptive Enhancement, coefficient alpahs range from .68 to .80
(Paulhus, 1991). The coefficient alpha for Self-Deceptive Enhancement in
the current sample is .65.

A measure of general intelligence was added as an exploratory

measure in i drder: to^

out the aitarnatiye hypothesis that general

:'intelligence (-^g") would account for more variance in the tendency to
fake good than SM, SD, or IM.; This m^
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is a 40 item, spiral omnibus

test of general intelligence (see appendix d). The reliability of this
measure in the present sairple is .834.
Procedure

Honest and fake conditions were operationalized by two different
instructions.

Honest instructions encouraged the subjects to respond

honestly/, as they really are (see appendix A). Fake instructions asked
the subjects to place themselves in a selection context where they are

an applicant for a job that they desire.

They were asked to respond to

the questions in a manner that they would use if they were an applicant
attempting to acquire the job. The instructions read:

Imagine that you are applying for a job that you really
want/ and your prospective employer will determine from this
test whether to hire you or not.

Please use this list of

common human attributes to describe yourself so as to ensure
that you will get the job.

Before each attribute, please write a number indicating how
that trait were to describe you if you were trying to give
the best possible impression of yourselff using the
following rating scale:

The rating scale was the same as the honest condition. Subjects received
the measures for SM, SD, and IM during their honest condition.

Otherwise, subjects in the. fake condition may have been in a ^^fake'' mind
set, and consequently there could have been be carry over ''^fake''' effects
on these measures.
Results

The data were analyzed using bivariate scatter plots, scatter

plots of the residuals, and expected normal probability plots. It was
determined that the assumptions of linearity and normality were

basically met. The minimum and maximum values, means, standard
deviations, and coefficient alphas for the scales of self-monitoring
(SM), social desirability (SD), impression management (IM), self
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deceptive enhancement (SDE), and the g measure are reported in table 1.
The reliabilities obtained in this sample for SM, SD, IM/ and SDE are

comparable to those reported by the authors of these scales. The means
and standard cteviatiohs for Sb and the two subscales (IM and SDE) are

comparable to what Paulhus reports (PaulhuSy Vl^Sl) - There were no
noirmative data available for the SM scale used in this study regarding

descriptives. The itiinimiim and maxiirium values, means, standard
deviations, coefficient alphas, and test-retest reliabilities for each

scale on the Big Five on both the honest and fake conditions are
reported in table 2.

The reliabilities of the Big Five dimensions are

also comparable to the reliabilities reported by Saucier (1994).

The

means and standard deviations for the within-subject correlations
between the honest and fake conditions for each dimension on the Big

Five are reported in table 3.

Participants significantly increased their scores from time one
(honest) to time two (fake) on each of the Big Five dimensions. Results

from these t-tests are reported in table 4. There were significant
correlations between means on the Big Five dimensions (both honest and
fake conditions) with SM, SD, IM, SDE, and the g measure (see table 5).

An interesting finding is the significant decrease in the correlations
with SD from the honest condition to the fake condition for

ConsGientiousness. On this dimension, there was a significant decrease

(Zobt = 2.43 > Z.025 = ±1.96, £ < .05) in the correlation between mean
scores in the honest condition and SD (r = .355, £ < .01) from the

correlation between the mean in the fake conditioh and SD (r = .210, £ <
.01). The correlation between the means on Conscientiousness and the g

measure significantly increased (£obt - -3.38 > £.025 = ±1.96, £ < .05)
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from the honest (r = .-.027, £• > .05) to the fake (r - .243, £ < .0^)
condition.

The correlation between the means on Emotional Stability and

the g measure also significantly increased (j^obt = -2.02 > z.025 = ±1.96,

£< .05), from the honest {r = .105, £ < .01) to the fake (r = .266, £ <
.01) condition.

The within-subject correlations for the honest and fake conditions
(■^wHF/ the index for faking) were transformed to z scores using Fishery's
r to z formula (Howell, 1992) in order to ensure an approximately normal

sampling distribution of r„HF- These transfoimed within-subject
correlations

were not significantly correlated with SM, SD, nor

IM for any of the Big Five dimensions. The correlations of these
transformed within-subject correlations with scores on SM, SD, IM, SDE,

and the g measure are reported for each Big Five scale in table 6. The
r'wHF for Emotional Stability was significantly correlated with scores on

the g measure (r = -.211; £<.01) . The r'wHF for Conscientiousness
significantly correlated with scores on SDE (£ = .112; £<.05) . SM was

significantly correlated with SD {r = .128, £ < .01) . IM (r = .899, £ <

.01), and SDE (£ = .816, £ < .01) were also significantly correlated
with SD, as would be expected since they are subscales of Social
Desirability (see table 7) .

Subjects tended to fake more (as evidenced by a lower average

-zt'whf) on the scale of Agreeableness (M r'wHF = .3993, SD j^whf = .63601)
than on Intellect (M t'wHF = .57508, SD x'whf = .62840)

(£obt = -.2161 < £.025

= ±1.96, a = .05) . Subjects also tended to exhibit more faking on
Conscientiousness (M ^^whf = . 38584, SD£whf = .47591) than on Intellect
(Zobt = -2.3503 > Z.025 = ±1.96, a = .05) .
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To examine the first hypothesis, a test of goodness of fit was

conducted using five multiple regression analyses. Using simultaneous
entry, the r'wHF for each scale was used as the criterion, and SM, SD,
IM, and the g measure were used as predictors. Results from these
multiple regression analyses are in table 8. Since these adjusted R as

goodness of fit indices were not significant (except for the Adjusted R

fob Emotional Stability, but even here it is extremely small) the
proposed structural equation analysis was not carried out.
-

V

Analyses were conducted on just the cases that were (1)

identified to be extreme fakers and (2) extremely consistent. This was.
done in order to isolate the effects occurring just for these extremes.

This was determined by selecting only those cases that were less than or

equal to the 33rd percentile, and greater than or equal to the 66th
percentile on the faking index for each of the dimensions.

Thus,

extreme fakers were identified by very large, negative values for
-2^wHF(the lowest 33 percent for these values on each dimension); and

extremely consistent subjects were identified by very large and positive
values for r r^HF (the highest 33 percent for those values on each
dimension).. T-tests were performed in order to determine if extreme

fakers scored significantly higher on the dimensions in the honest and
fake conditions than the non-fakers. For the fake good condition on

Extraversion (time 2), extreme fakers (M = 6.72 , SD = 1.16) scored

significantly higher [t(209) = 3.584, £ < .000], than extreme non-fakers
fakers (M = 6.14 , SD = 1.17) .,

Extreme fakers (M =7.14,/^ =1.05)

also scored significantly higher than the extremely consistent subjects

(M =6.22,

1.36) on the fake condition of Emotional Stability

[t(209) = 5.517, £ < .0001. The extremely consistent subjects (M = 6.86
, SD = 1.05) scored significantly higher on the honest condition of

24

Conscientiousness [t(212) = -3.802, £ < .000] than the extreme- fakers (M
= 6.33, SD = .989).

Originally/ r„HF was proposed as the index of faking. However

opposite to what was hypothesized, positive correlations between this
index and SM, SD, and IM were obtained. In order to get a broader sense

of the relationships between faking good and SM, SD, and IM, two other

indices of faking were calculated.

These were Meanfake

Meanhonest (Dra)

for each individual, as well as the within-subject variance of

the

differences in responses to the items under the honest and fake

conditions (S^d)• Greater values for Dfh are associated with more faking
(a change in the positive direction from honest to fake).

Greater

values of S^wd are also associated with more faking, while smaller values
indicate subjects who give very consistent responses. However, as

Lautenschlager (1986) notes, S^wd is insensitive to constant
discrepancies. Nevertheless, this index of faking was examined in an
effort to better understand the construct of faking good. When Dfh is
used as a measure of faking, it is evident by correlations with SM, SD,

and IM (see table 6) that faking good is negatively associated with
these constructs. That is, the more subjects tended to fake good (i.e.,

the greater the positive change from honest to fake) the lower these
subjects were on SM, SD, and IM. Additionally, Dfh as a faking index was

positiveiy correlated with higher scores on the g measure for
Extraversion, Conscientiousness, and Emotional Stability. However, when

S^wD is used as an index of faking, the relationship between faking good
and SM, SD, and IM is further clouded. The correlations between these

constructs and S^wd: ^or each dimension of the Big Five are non

significant, and some are negative while others are positive. When S^wd
is used, there were significant correlations between SDE and faking good
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for Agreeableness (r = .151, £ < .01), and Emotional Stability(r =,.119,

£ < .05). Moreover, faking good (S^wd) on Emotional Stability is
negatively associated with higher scores on the g measure (r = -.113, p
< .05).

Discussion

The hypothesis that faking good on a personality measure would be
correlated with the constructs of Self-Monitoring (SM), Social

Desirability .(SO), and Impression Management (IM) was not supported.

Faking good (as measured by the within-subject correlation between
scores on each of the Big Five scales in the honest arid fake conditions)
was not significantly correlated with any of the scales. Therefore in
the context of this study, students displayed the tendency to fake good
or not fake good regardless of their orientations on SM, SD, and. IM.

These results imply that faking good as an individual difference
variable is a unitary and separate construct, unrelated to constructs of
self-presentation.

A measure of general intelligence was employed in this study in
order to rule out an alternative hypothesis that ^''g" would account for
any potential individual differences in faking, rather than SM, SD, or
IM. There was no evidence for this alternative hypothesis. In fact,

faking good on Emotional Stability was negatively correlated with scores
on the g measure. Thus, those individuals, who displayed the tendency to
fake good on this particular dimension also scored lower on the g
measure. The fact that individual differences in faking good were not

felated to general intelligence lends more credit to the notion that
faking good is a unified and separate construct.
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One factor that may:have contributed to the non-significant
correlations between t'whf for each dimension; of the Big Five and, the

:

scales of SM, SD, and IM is the lack of stability of these withinsubject correlations. These correlations were based on eight items

all dimensions of the Big Five (except Conscientiousness, which was
based on twenty items). These small N sizes produce unstable correlation

coefficients with very large confidence intervals. The width of the
confidence interval around r„HF for Conscientiousness is ± .4753, more
than one and a half standard deviation units. The width of the

confidence■intervals for Extraversion, Agreeableness> Emotibnai ;
Stability, and Ihtellect i-s i: .8765, greater than two /Standard

deviations for these' withih-subject correlations.

Therefore the true

values for r„HF across scales range from (plus or ndnus) one and a; half
to two standard deviations from the obtained within-siibject

;

/

cofrelations. Given these confidence intervals, the within-subject:
correlations must be interpreted with caution.

indeed, Lautenschlager

(1986) nbtes that when r„HF is used as an index of faking, Ibhger
guestionnaires should, be employed in order to yield more stable within-

subject correlati6ns.Additionaily, large sample sizes should be used to
control for individual differences in reliability. While the sample size

of the current study appears to be sufficient, the nximber of items on
which the within-subject correlations are based does not.

Moreover, it is uncertain whether rwHF as a faking index is
reliable. That is, it is not known whether individuals would obtain
similar correlations between scores in the honest and fake conditions in

another situation. If a measure is unreliable, it will have near zero
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correlations with other constructs. Thus, further research on rwHF as a

faking index is indeed necessary.

Additional findings that lend discredit to the within-subject
correlations are the t-tests for the difference between the means on

each dimension from time one and time two.

These results indicate that

subjects are significantly increasing their scores from the honest to

fake conditions. This would suggest that on the whole, subjects tended

to exhibit some degree of faking good.

However, r„iiF as an index of

faking is not congruent with these t-tests. While there is variability
in the within-subject correlations, overall, subjects are fairly .

consistent in their responses from the honest to the fake conditions
(mean within-subject correlations ranged from .287 to .416).
In an effort to better understand the processes of faking good,

two other measures of faking were employed: Dfh and S^wd- Dfh is the
difference between scores in the fake and honest condition for each

dimension. S^wd is the within-subject variance of the differences in the
responses to each item under the two conditions of honest and fake. When
the results of the three indices of faking good are compared across
dimensions (see table 6), it is evident that each index reveals

something different about faking. While faking good (as operationalized
by strong, negative within-subject correlations) is not significantly
correlated with SD, SM, or IM, the difference scores from the conditions

of honest to fake are significantly and negatively correlated with SM,
SD, and IM. Analyses using the difference scores reveal that the more

subjects fake good, the lower the subjects score on SM, SD, and IM.

However, these conclusions are not upheld when S^wd is used as a measure
of faking. Analyses using the within-subject variances of the

differences as a measure of faking yield insignificant and erratic
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correlations. Thus, regardless of which index of faking is used, faking
good is still unrelated to the constructs of SM, SD, and IM, This
further supports faking good as an independent construct.
Another notable result is that on Conscientiousness, the
correlations between the mean scores on this dimension and SD

significantly decreased from the honest to fake conditions.
One explanation for this decrease in correlations from the honest to

fake conditions may be method variance. That is, the differences in
these correlations may not be indicative of a true relationship. For
instance, in the honest condition the correlation for the means on
Conscientiousness and SD was .355.. In the fake condition, this

correlation dropped to .210. This is a significant difference in the

correlations (Zobt = 2.43 > £.025 = ±1.96, p < .05). Scores on SD may have
been affected by subjects' responses to the Big Five in the honest
condition, which they completed before any of the other measures. In the
honest condition, one would expect significant correlations between
means on the Big Five dimensions with scores on SD since subjects'

responses to items on the Big Five will influence their subsequent

responses to the measures that follow it (SM, SD, IM). However, subjects

did not get a second administration of SM, SD, and IM in the fake
condition. Responses to the Big Five in the fake condition are

influenced by a new instructional set, and therefore, means at time 2 on
the dimensions would not likely be as correlated with SD as means on the

dimensions at time one. Any genuine differences that may exist between
honest and fake conditions concerning the relationship of a dimension
and SD could only be revealed and interpreted had these measures been
given at time two.
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In addition to possible method variance accounting for the
differences in these correlations^ recent meta-analytic work using 239
studies (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1995) shows that scores on measures

of Conscientiousness are typically correlated about .20 with measures of

Social Desirability. Thus it would appear that perhaps the correlation
between Conscientiousness and SD at time two (r = .210, £ < .01) is
approaching this ^^true" correlation between the two constructs.

Conversely, the correlation between Conscientiousness and SD at time
one, where subjects received both measures (r = .355, £ < -01), may be
an inflated indication of the relationship due to potential method
variance.
Limitations

Factors that may have contributed to the unexpected findings of
this study include the limitations associated with using a college

student population as participants, as opposed to actual job applicants.
The instructions for the fake good condition asked subjects to place

themselves in a selection context where they were an applicant for a job
that they really desire.

They were asked to respond to the questions in

a manner that they would use if they were seriously attempting to land

the job. Students participating in this study were possibly not as
motivated to respond in. the manner of a job applicant.

They did not

have a vested interest in the outcome of obtaining or not obtaining the

desired job. It is reasonable to suggest that individual differences in
the tendency to fake good may manifest themselves differently depending
on the situation; and in this particular study, subjects' tendency to

fake good may not have been elicited with the instructions alone. Even

though there was variance in the values and magnitudes of the faking
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index (r'^Hr)/ perhaps different results would have been attained had an
applicant population been used.

Contrary to what would be expected given the instructions to fake

good, some participants actually decreased their scores in the fake good
condition as compared to their scores in the honest condition. Across
dimensions, between 10 to 30 percent of the subjects had negative values
for Dfh. This decrease in scores indicates that subjects actually faked

bad in the fake good condition. Unfortunately, strong, negative values

of the within-subject correlations would mis-^identify those subjects as
fakers since their scores were indeed inconsistent from the honest to
the fake condition.

Another possible limitation could be the ceiling confound. While
an attempt was; made to alleviate this potential confound by using^^ more:
than one perspnality dimension, it is possible that the people who are

the actual fakers in this samp^

scored high across all

dimensions in the honest condition. In time two, when these

true"

fakers were instructed to fake gobd, they had no room to further enhance

their scores given their previous high scores in the honest condition.:
If this was the case/ these true fakers were identified as extremely

consistent subjects (with large, positive values for r'whf)/ und thus
mis-identified as extreme non-fakers. In his discussion of r^r as a:

measure .of faking, Lautenschlager (1986) notes a possible interpretation

of large, positive values for r„HF/

is possible that some of these

individuals are consistent fakers under both response sets, but then no

method outside of external validation will detect them.'' (p. 311). If
the real fakers were mis-identified as consistent respondents, then the
correlations between r'„HF for each dimension and SM, SD, and IM are
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inaccurate indicators of the relationship between faking good and these
Gonstruets- Moreover, the difference scores (Dfh) would also fail to

identify these consistent fakers since they would have little change in

their scores. Finally, S^wd would also fail to identify these consistent
fakers since their values for the within-subject variance of the

differences would likewise be small, causing these people to be treated
as consistent respondents.

Thus, given the current methods for

detecting faking, there appears to be no way to identify those
consistent fakers who initially score high in time one, and

correspondingly in time two. This limitation in measuring faking
cohtaininates any association that may exist between:faking good and, SM>
.,SD,V and ■

.

^

Theoretical Implications

The information re^a^

faking good as an individual difference

variable obtained from this study is valuable because it shows that

people do vary in their tendency to fake good on a personality measure;

and people vary in this tehdency depending on the particular dimension
of persohality being assessed- Analyses of the differences between the
means of the transformed within-subject correlatiphs

reveal that

more faking tended to occur on the eonscientiousness dimension thari on
the Intellect dimension, and more faking occurred on the Agreeableness

dimension than on the Intellect dimension. This is evidenced by the

lower within-subject correlations on Conscientiousness and Agfeeableness
than on Intellect.

Moreover, results of this study suggest that faking good is its

own construct. Faking good was not related to any of the hypothesized:
constructs, not even general intelligence. Even though the tendency to

fake good was not found to be related to SM, SD, nor IM, it was
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nevertheless found to be an individual difference variable.

Future

research should continue to address faking good as an individual

difference variable, and identify the situations and circumstances in
which this tendency will, and will not be manifested.

Whether these findings are indicative of true relationships
remains to be tested with more accurate and stable measures of faking.

In the current study, it is unclear whether faking good truly is
unrelated to SM, SD, and IM, or whether faking good failed to be

captured by the measures of faking that were utilized. Additionally, the
current indices of faking are incapable of differentiating those people
who score high in the honest condition across personality dimensions and
are truly those who would display the tendency to fake good, from those
people who are consistent from honest to fake conditions and who would

not display this tendency.
Future Research

Therefore the current study has exposed three avenues for future

research. The first involves developing better methods for measuring
faking, since the three utilized in this study all revealed different

results regarding faking. Secondly, if

is used in future studies,

longer measures of personality should be used in order to produce more
reliable within-subject correlations. By increasing the length of the
measures, not only will the stability of r^HF be increased, but a more
accurate measure of this construct will be obtained.

Indeed, Ones and

Viswesvaran {in press) note that in order to increase the criterionrelated validities of Conscientiousness, more than one Conscientiousness

scale should be used in prediction because the criterion-related

validity of a composite of Conscientiousness scales is higher than any
one measure of Conscientiousness.

Hence, it is not unreasonable to
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administer a longer, aggregated scale of Conscientiousness in order to
obtain more stable estimates of Twrf as well as the construct of

Conscientiousness itself. However it is important to note that the

within-subject correlations between responses from the honest to fake
conditions is more a measure of consistency of pattern rather than

consistency of level/ and thus may not be the most appropriate measure
of faking. Thirdly, future design methods for research in faking good
should include an administration of the independent variables during the
fake good condition as well as the honest condition in order that more
accurate interpretations of the decreased correlations from honest to-

fake conditions can be made. Additionally, these measures of SM, SD, and
IM should also be given at a time before the personality measure is .
administered.

in this way, a more pure assessment of these constructs

can be made since the threat of method variance that was introduced in

the current study can be reduced.
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■Table 1

> . -

Means and Standard Deviations for Self-Monitoring^ Social Desirability^ Impression Management^ Self-"

Deceptive Enhancement,. , and the g measure

Coefficient

Number of

Total

It erns

Possible

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

SD

alpha

Self-Monitoring^

13

5

1.77

4.85

3.32

.529

.757

Social Desirability^

40

40

1

11.40

5.55

.783

Impression Management^

20

20

0

15

5.48

3.37

.724

Self-Deceptive Enhancement^

20

0

17

5.92

3.19

.650

g Measure^

40

3

37

16. 64

6.24

.834

. Scale

- :
V

20
40

■

31.

323

a;

N

b:

N = 321'

c-.; ■

N = 312

d:

N = 314

LO
CO

Table 2

Meansy Standard Deviations^ Reliability Coefficients/ and Test-Retest Reliabilities for all Big Five
Dimensions (honest and fake conditions)
Test-Retest

Reliability
n

Scale

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

SD

Coefficient
a

Extraversion (honest)^

1.5

.383

8.75

5.73

1.41

8.88

6.49

1.17

.761

Extraversion (fake) ^

318

Agreeableness (honest) ^

322

3.88

9

7.11

1.20

.767

Agreeableness (fake) ^

321

3.75

9

7.62

1.02

.796

Conscientiousness (honest)^

318

3.7

8.75

6.68

1.01

.883

Conscientiousness (fake) ^

314

3.5

9

7.65

1.00

.922

5.33

1.30

.728

00

Emotional Stability(honest) ^ , 319

2.12

8.88

Emotional Stability (fake) ^

00
317

3

9

6.76,

1.26

.761

Intellect (honest) ^

322

2.62

9

6.47

1.18

.772

Intellect (fake) ^

319

2.65

9

6.92

1.01

.732

Total possible score on all scales.
a:

number of items = 8

b:

number of items = 20

honest

for
T1 & T2

.524

.453

.383
00

and fake. is 9.

00
CO
MC

00
K>
O

.468

Table 3 .

•

Means and Standard Deviations for the Within-Subject Correlations of the
Honest and Fake Conditions (r^Ew) for Each Scale of the Big Five

Scale

M

Minimum

Extraversion Xwef

321

Agreeableness r^^HF

Maximum

Mean

SD

-.933

.3596

.'4230

299

-.820

.2871

.4401

Conscientiousness r^HF

311

-.509

■ .999

.3120

.2974

Emotional Stability

318

-.945 \

1.00

.3166

.4130

Intellect t^hf

312

-.845

1.00

.4155

.4111

o

o
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Table 4

Results from T-tests on the Differences Between Means on Time 2 (fake) and Time 1 (honest) for each

Dimension on the Big Five

^

^

^

^

^

^

^

— :

Mean 1
(honest)

Mean 2

Difference

Significance

95% Confidence
Interval of
the Difference

(fake)

(Mean 1 - Mean 2)

t

df

(two-tailed)

Lower

Upper

Extraversion

5.74

6.48

-.746

-10.31

314

.000

-.888

ZYsW'

Agreeableness-

7.11

7.62

-.516

-8.91

319

iooo

-.630

-.402

Conscientiousness

6.69

7.65

-.955

-16.1

312

.000

-1.07

-.839

Emotional Stability

5.33

6.75

-1.42

-17.71

315

,000

-1,58

-1.26

Intellect

6.47

6.92

-.452

-7.03

318

.000

-.578

-.325

Scale

06
00

Table 5

Correlations Between Scores on the Big Five Dimensions <honest and fake conditions) and Self-

Monitoring^ Social Desirability^ Impression Management/ Self-Deceptive Enhancement^ and the g Measure

Self-

Social

Impression

Self-Deceptive

g

Monitoring

Desirability

Management

Enhancement

measure

.183**

^060^

.255**

- .034

.284*^

.180**

.098

.211**

.069

Agreeableness (mean 1)

.045

.304**

.361**

.147**

.032

Agreeableness (mean 2)

.047

.219**

.260**

,107

.076

Conscientiousness (mean 1)

.121^

.355**

.365**

.234**

- .027

Conscientiousness (mean 2)

.127*

.210**

.220**

.133**

.243**

Emotional Stability (mean 1)

- .082

.363**

.337**

.277**

.105

Emotional Stability (mean 2)

.001

.243**

.242**

.167**

.266**

.188**

.127*

.082

.115*

Extraversion (mean 1)

Extraversion (mean 2)

Intellect (mean 1)

.182**

.179**

.116*

Intellect (mean 2)

.182**

.108

.099

* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-taiied).
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2"-tailed)

cr>
00

■■Table;6; '

Correlations Between All Indices of Faking Across All Big Five Dimensions

SelfMonitoring

Social
Desirability

Impression
Management

-064
-.140^
-.025

.059
-.035
-.016

.054
.024
-.041

Self-Deceptive
Enhancement

Extraversion

'

Dhp

.

-

.045
-.087
.017.

-.087
.111*
-.062

-.011 ,

Agreeableness
: :

;

.025

Dhf

.

-.006

■ S'^WD : ■

-.,032. .

-.039 .

-.030

-.035

-.109

-.129*

-.054

.051

-.059

.151**

.034

-.103 ,
o

Conscien.tiousness

.

r'wHF

.070

.082

Dar

.011

-.139*

S^„D

-.026

-.012

Emotional Stability, , .
r'wHF

.071

.040

\

.

-.115*

S\d
intellect
r'„HF

■

.012

.027

.

.033

.112*

-.085

-.141*

-.094

.265**

-.100

.085

-.105

-.211**

.060

.006

-.091

-.105

.141*,

-.068

.119*

-.113*,

-.048

.070

.012

.110

.029

Dhf

-.031

-.095

-.037

-.125*

-.030

s\d

-.063

.047

.050

.028

-.090

* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed) .
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) .

Table 7

Pearson Correlations Between Self-Monitoring^ Social Desirability/ Impression Management^ and SelfDeceptive Enhancement and the g Measure

Self-Monitoring
Social Desirability

Social
Desirability

Impression
Management.

Self-Deceptive
Enhancement

9
Measure

.138*

-.016

.257**

-.622

.855**

.837**

-.003

.432**

.015

- Impression Management
Self-Deceptive Enhancement

** Correlation is.significant at. the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

-.021

Table-8

.

.

Results from Multiple Regression Analyses as Tests of Goodness of Fit.

R

Extraversion

R

Adjusted R

df

F

__

_____

TTsr
314

Agreeableness

.037

.001

-.021

4

.100

232
Conscientiousness

.160

.026

,013

4

1.99

304

^Emotional Stability

.242

.059

.047

4

4.842***

311
Intellect

,098

.01

-.003

4

.734

305

* Significant beta weight for g measure (>ff = -.215; p < .001)
*** Correlations significant at the ,001 level.
Note: The independent variables are Self Monitoring, Social
Desirability, Impression Management, and the g Measure. The Dependent
Variables for each of the multiple regressions are the transformed,

within-subject correlations for the respective Big Five dimensions.
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Figure
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E2

Appendix A

.

Mini Markers (Saucier, 1994)

How Accurately Can You Descril>e lff"ourself?
Please use this list of common human attributes to describe yourself as
accurately as possible. Describe yourself as you see yourself at the present

time, not as you wish to be in the future.

Describe yourself as you are

generally or typically, as compared with other persons you know of the same
sex and of roughly your same age.

Before each attribute, please write a niomber indicating how accurately
that trait describes you, using the following rating scale:

inaccurate

Accurate

Extremely Very Moderately Slightly
1

2

3

:

4

Slightly Moderately Very Extremely
5

6

7

8

Bashful

Neat

Bold

Negligent
Organized
Philosophical

Careful

Careless
Cold

Practical

Complex
Conscientious

Prompt
Quiet

Cooperative

Relaxed

Creative

Rude

Deep

Shy
Sloppy
Steady

Disorganized
Efficient

9

Sympathetic
Systematic

Energetic
Envious

Extraverted

Talkative

Fretful

Temperamental
Thorough
Touchy

Haphazard
Harsh

Imaginative
Impractical

Uncreative

Undependable

Inconsistent

Unenvious

Inefficient

Unintellectual

Intellectual

Unsympathetic
Unsystematic

Jealous

Kind

Warm

Moody

tothdrawn

*Note that these direction differ for the ^^fake'' condition.
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Appendix B

'Revised Self-Monitoring Scale (Lennox & Wolfe^ 1984^ p. 1361)
Subscale/item

M

Ability to modify self-presentation
1.
In social situations, I have the
ability to alter my behavior if I
feel something else is called for.
3.
I have the ability to control the way
I come across to people, depending on the
impression I wish to give them.
7.
When I feel that the image I am

portraying isn't working, I can readily
change it to something that does.
*9. I have trouble changing my behavior
to meet the requirements of any situation
I find myself in.
10. I have found that I can adjust my

SD

r with

. r with

subscale

total

.42

.29

3.2

1.0

.46

.45

2.4

1.1

.45

.41

3.1

1.2,

.56

.46

3.1

1.0

.60

.48

2.8

1.2

.30

.28

behavior to meet the requirements of any
situation I find myself in.

*12. Even when it might be, to my
advantage, I have difficulty putting up a

.

good front.
13.

Once I know what the situation calls

3.0

1.0

.65

.54

3.2

1.0

.42

.40

3.4

1.3

.36

.22

3.7

.09

.47

.32

3.5

1.0

.35

.31

3.8

.08

.53

.44

3.1

1.0

.42

.29

for it's easy for me to regulate my
actions accordingly.
Sensitivity to expressive behavior of
others

2.
I am often able to read people's true
emotions correctly through their eyes.
4.
In conversations, I am sensitive to

even the slightest change in the facial
expression of the person I'm conversing
with.

5.

My powers Of intuition are quite good

when it comes to understanding others'
emotions and motives.

6.
I can usually tell when others
consider a joke to be in bad taste, even

though they may laugh convincingly.
8.
I can usually tell when I've said
something inappropriate by reading it in
the listener's eyes.
11. If someone is lying to me, I usually
know it at once from that person's manner
of expression.
* Indicates items that are reversed coded.

Response format is a six point, Likert type scale:
0 = certainly, always false
1 = generally false
2 = somewhat false

3 = somewhat true, ,but with exception
4 = generally true
^
5 = certainly, always true
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Appendix C
BIDR Version 6 - form 40 (Paulhus, 1991).

Using the scale below as a,guide, write a number beside each statement
to indicate how much you agree with it.
1

2

3

NOT TRUE

4

5

SOMEWHAT

6

7
VERY TRUE

TRUE

___

___

1.
*2.
3.

My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right.
It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits.
I don't care to know what other people rally think of me.

*4.

I have not always been honest with myself.

5.
*6.
7.

I always know why I like things.
When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking.
Once I've irtade up mind, other people can seldom change my

*8.
9.
*10.
11.
*12.

I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit.
I am fully in control of my own fate.
It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought.
I never, regret my decisions.
I sometimes miss out on things because I can't make up rny

opinion.

mindVsoph"enough
^

13^

^14,^ ^: M^
i

;

15.

'. v;:'; ; -r"

■

'v.

The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference.

were; not always fair when they punished me^

am a completely rational person. .

\;*i'6.v.;''' .;I. rarely appreciate criticism.
17.
;;: -*18;..'
19.

I am very confident of my judgments ^
I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover.
It's all right, with me if some people happen to dislike me.

"v-*20. '■ ,i don't always know the reasons why I do the things I do.
• *21.

I sometimes telT lies if I have to.

novor cover up my mistakes.
'

*23.

There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of
someone.

24.

I never swear.

*25.
26.
*27.

I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forgetv
I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught.
I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her

28.
*29.

When I hear people>talking privately, I avoid listening.
I have received too much change from a salesperson without

back.

.

telling him or her.

30.

I always declare everything a customs.

46

*31.
32.
*33.
34.
*35.
36.
*37.
38.
*39.
40.

When I was young I sometimes stole things..
I have never dropped litter on the street.
I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit.
I never read sexy books or magazines.
I have done things that I don't tell other people about.
I never take things that don't belong to me.
I have taken sick-leave from work or school even thought I
wasn't really sick.
I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise
without reporting it.
I have some pretty awful habits.
I don't gossip about other people's business.

Items 1-20 assess Self-Deceptive Enhancement; items 21-40 assess
Impression Management.
* indicates items keyed in the false" (negative) direction.

47

Appendix D.
DIRECTIONS

•

This is an exercise to appraise your knowledge of general information.
Please answer the questions to the best of your ability. This portion
should take no more than 12 minutes.

•

Answer the questions by putting the,correct answer within the parentheses.
You should not use any outside resources to complete these questions.

•

The following two questions are examples.

The opposite of down is:
1.

east

2.

under

3.

up

4.

cover
(

UP

)

"What is your change from $1.00 when you buy one item costing 16 cents and a
second item costing 34 cents?

(50 cents)

Please Begin Answering the Questions

1.

A person who is elated is:
1. sad

2.

2.

Happy

4.

Gifted

5, Passive .,..(

2. Desk

3. Cabinet 4,

Stove

5. Calculator ....(

2. Curiosity

3, Happiness

4. Skill

5. Tired ......(

)

)

Square is to circle as cube is to:

1. Rectangle 2. Pyramid 3. Sphere 4. Trapezoid 5. Triangle

5.

)

Work is to pay as practice is to:
1. Wealth

4.

3.

Which of the following is most unlike the others?

1. Typewriter
3.

Angry

(

)

.....(

)

Eight percent of $20,000 is equal to sixteen percent
of what amount?

Continued on the next page
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6.

Consider the following:
A is larger than B
C is smaller than D

C is larger than A
Which is the

largest?

7.

....................

)

5. Change .....(

)

To alleviate is to:

1. Hasten

8.

(

2. Ease

3

Prolon

4. Restrict

When the following are arranged in an increasing sequence, what is the
first letter of the third word:

Square

9.

Cube

Li^e

Point

(

)

.(

),

(

)

Permissive does not mean:
1.

Restrictive

4.

Pardonable

2.

5.

Allowable

3.

Agreeable

Loose

...

10. Which is the best example of an entrepreneur?
1.

Usher

5.

Janitor

2.

Foreman

3.

Fireman

4.

Grocer

11. If you had 13 cases of beans, 20 cases of carrots, 17 cases of pears and
11 cases of corn, how many cases of vegetables would you have?..(
)

12. l^ich has the most similar meaning to lazy?
1.

Indulgent

5,

Involucrum

2.

Insolvent

3.

Indolent

4.

Inertia
)

13. What should the first two numbers in this series be?

16

4

9

3

4

2

,.(

)

...(

)

......(

)

14. Which of the following is most unlike a triangle?
1.

Square

5.

Hexagon

2.

Trapezoid

3.

Rectangle

4.

Circle

15. A storage space measures 18 ft. x 10 ft. x 10 ft^
What portion of this space will be occupied by 300 crates,
each 3 ft. x 1 ft. x 1 ft in size?

Continued on the next page
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16. Il'-Thich word is least appropriate in the group below?,
1. Rock

2. Metal

3. Salt

4. Fish

5. Water

.....(

)

. ........................ w.(

)

17. What is the next number in the following sequence?

1

3

V

6

10

15

18. Fred, Alice, and George own 1/4, 5/12, and 1/3 of a company,
respectively. The profits least year were $120,000. How much less
would Alice have earned if the profits were divided evenly,
rather, than on the above basis?

)

19. Aristotle is to philosophy what Samuelson is to:
1. History

2.

Literature

3. Mathematics

4. Agriculture

5. Economics ...................

( ^

)

20. What is the last letter of the third word when the following is rearranged
to make a complete sentence?

orod

poen

eht .............

......(

21. A man paid 20% income tax on his yearly income of $15,500.
The government returned 10% of the amount of tax paid.
How much was he taxed for the year?

)

(

)

(

)

..(

)

22. What is the next number in the series?

2

5

11

23

.

23. A flipped coin comes up heads three consecutive tosses.
The chances for heads on the fourth toss are:

1.

1 in 1

2.

4.

1 in 4

5

1 in 2

3.

1 in 3

1 in 5

24. Peter borrowed $25,000 at a 7 1/2 percent rate per annum. He received a
bill for a quarterly interest payment. What was the amount?.....(
)

25. Which number or letter in the following sequence is incorrect?
1

D

3;

E

5

F

6

G

9

H ........(

)

26. The sum of three consecutive even numbers is 102.

What is the smallest number?

)

27. Sedate is most siiailar to:

1. Composed

2. Affected

3. Angry

4. Concerned

5. Select ... (

)

Continued on the next page
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28. "What is the missing, fraction in the following, series?

374

11/16

9/16

1/2

.r

29. Assiame the following two statements are true. ''''All conservatives are
businessmen. Bob is a liberal." From this, you can deduct:
1.

Bob is not a businessman.

2.

Bob is a businessman

3.

Bob may or may not be a businessman.

4.

None of the above.

5.

Two of the above

•••

(

)

5. Pavlov ..... (

)

5. Portuguese ...(

)

30. A famous anthropologist is:
1. Aristotle

2. Freud

3. Mead

4. Darwin

31. Which of the following does not belong?

1. French

2. Spanish

3. Italian

4. Russian

32. A watch loses 20 seconds every 10 hours. If it has been properly set at
6:00 a.m. on Monday, how slow will it be by noon on Tuesday? ...(
)

33. What is the missing number?

12

21

23

32

,

54

67

76 ...

(

)

34. A freight train one mile long goes through a tunnel that is one mile long.
If the train is traveling at a speed of 15 miles per hour, how long does
it take to pass through the tunnel?
......(
)
35. Satiate is the same as:

1. Jailed

2. Incarcerate /3. Slovenly

4. Free

5. Satisfy ....(

)

36. A department, working at 80 percent efficiency, produces 640 pieces per
hour. What is the efficiency when this department produces 760 pieces per
hour?

........(

)

37. The manpower requirements for a certain plant are: first shift, 600;
second shift, 2/3's as itiany; and third shift, 1/2 of the total of the
first two shifts. How many total people are required for the three
shifts?

)

38. What is the first letter of the third word when the following are arranged
in their proper order?
1.

Broke

2.

Cereal

3.

Go

4.

Baby

5.

The

(

)

Continued on the next page
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39. Two small planes leave cities 970 miles apart and travel toward each
other, one plane's average speed is 40 miles per hour greater than that of
the other plane. If they meet in two and one-half hours, what is the speed
of the slower plane?
..>
...(
)
40. Moon is to sun as:

1.

Day is to night

2.

Light is to dark

3.

Fork is to tea

4.

Friend is to foe

5.

Sea is to land

.(
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